Cambridge University Press Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy

How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17 per cent of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explains how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO, and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms, and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents, and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, and Argentina. Review 'Controlling Institutions develops an original and persuasive theory about informal governance and power in world politics. Anyone who wants to understand how international organizations really operate should read this book.' Robert O. Keohane, Princeton University'The United States has long exercised disproportionate power within key international institutions. In this rigorous and compelling account, Randall Stone explains, for the first time, the sources of America's informal influence over global governance.' Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations, University of California, San Diego'Cogently combining innovative theory, statistical analysis, and case studies, Stone pries open the black box of how the United States has gained so much influence over the behavior of international organizations such as the IMF.' Thomas D. Willett, Horton Professor of Economics at The Claremont Colleges Book Description This book argues that informal state power explains the institutional design, performance shortcomings and legitimacy problems in international organizations. About the Author Randall W. Stone is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. He is the author of Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition (2002) and Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (1996). His articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Review of International Organizations and Global Environmental Politics.