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£83.48
MACMILLAN Sovereign Debt Crises and Negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914: Governments versus Bankers
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Description
Product Description This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation. From the Back Cover This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation. About the Author Leonardo Weller is Lecturer at the São Paulo School of Economics, Fundação Getulio Vargas, (EESP-FGV), Brazil. He earned his PhD at the London School of Economics, UK.
Product Specifications
- Brand
- MACMILLAN
- Format
- paperback
- ASIN
- 3030088243
- Domain
- Amazon UK
- Release Date
- 01 February 2019
- Listed Since
- 31 January 2019
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