MACMILLAN Moral Error Theory

This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with ‘schmoral’ judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls ‘the fundamental desire’; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation. Review “In his thorough, lucid, rich, and valuable book Wouter Kalf investigates how we should understand the error theory, what the best arguments for it are, and what we should do if we come to accept it. … It is essential reading for all of those interested in whether there are any genuine moral obligations.” (Richard Rowland, The Philosophical Quarterly, May 30, 2019) From the Back Cover This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with ‘schmoral’ judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls ‘the fundamental desire’; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation. About the Author Wouter Floris Kalf is Postdoctoral Researcher and Assistant Professor in philosophy at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. Dr Kalf has taught philosophy at the universities of York, Bristol, Leeds, and various universities in the Netherlands. He has published on metaethics in such journals as Philosophical Studies and The Journal of Value Inquiry.