Cambridge University Press Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence theories and the idea that some value beliefs are warranted on the basis of emotional experience. Professor Lemos defends the view that some value beliefs enjoy 'modest' a priori justification. The book is intended primarily for professional philosophers and their graduate students working in ethics, value theory and epistemology. Review "...the discussions of higher goods and moral epistemology are quite useful, and the book as a whole is valuable in offering an unusually systematic treatment of a central concept of ethical theory." Ethics"In each case the discussion is controlled and acute and the conclusions provide significant challenges." Canadian Philosophical Reviews"Despite its rather slender size, Professor Lemos's book is philosophically very rich." Paul Eisenberg, International Philosophical Quarterly Book Description This book explores the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value. From the Back Cover This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are "higher" than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of "fitting" emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence theories and the idea that some value beliefs are warranted on the basis of emotional experience. Professor Lemos defends the view that some value beliefs enjoy "modest" a priori justification. The book is intended primarily for professional philosophers and their advanced students working in ethics, value theory, and epistemology.