Cambridge University Press Intention and Wrongdoing: In Defense of Double Effect

According to the principle of double effect, there is a strict moral constraint against bringing about serious harm to the innocent intentionally, but it is permissible in a wider range of circumstances to act in a way that brings about harm as a foreseen but non-intended side effect. This idea plays an important role in just war theory and international law, and in the twentieth century Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot invoked it as a way of resisting consequentialism. However, many moral philosophers now regard the principle with hostility or suspicion. Challenging the philosophical orthodoxy, Joshua Stuchlik defends the principle of double effect, situating it within a moral framework of human solidarity and responding to philosophical objections to it. His study uncovers links between ethics, philosophy of action, and moral psychology, and will be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the moral relevance of intention. Book Description A comprehensive defense of the principle of double effect and the importance of intentions for normative ethics. About the Author Joshua Stuchlik is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas, Minnesota. He works on ethics, the philosophy of action, and epistemology, and has published articles in journals including Philosophical Studies, Synthese, and the Journal of Moral Philosophy.