Cambridge University Press Deontic Morality and Control (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified. Review 'Readers interested in recent debates not only in its main field but in virtue ethics, or on the relation of morality to practical reason, will find the work impressively up to date and incisively engaged.' Journal of Moral Philosophy'rigorous and thought-provoking work, … Haji's arguments are meticulous and intriguing and I found much in the work in which I agreed. … Haji has addressed a problem that has not received sufficient attention. For whilst the literature on control and responsibility is huge, far less has been said about control and deontic morality.' Philosophical Writings Book Description This book analyses whether determinism or indeterminism is compatible with moral obligation, right or wrong.