Cambridge University Press For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Product Description This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonic logic are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked. Review "The book is recommended reading for philosophers and logicians concerned with conditional logics and inductive inference and will interest researchers in artificial intelligence involved in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision." A. Florea, Computing Reviews"The book is recommended reading for hilosophers and logicians concerned with conditional logics and inductive inference and will interest researchers in artificial intelligence involved in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision." A. Florea, Computing Reviews"This is no doubt a major contribution..." Otavio Bueno, Mathematical Reviews"This is in itself valuable. Philosophers will find in this book a conscientious and by and large successful attempt to come to terms with some of the basic work in nonmonotonic reasoning, and to render it in language that is familiar to them." Michael Morreau, Jrnl of Philosophy Book Description This book offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. From the Back Cover This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction, and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made "for the sake of the argument" sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such hypothetical belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonicity are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief-contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked. In arguing that the distinction between belief contravening and inductive nonmonotonicity plays a far greater role in deliberation and decision than it is given credit for, this major study will be required reading for all philosophers and logicians concerned with conditionals, decision theory, and inductive inference. It will also interest those in artificial intelligence who work on expert systems, default reasoning, and nonmonotonic reasoning.