Routledge Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge (Routledge Library Editions: Ethics)

Originally published in 1979, this book shows that a recognition of the rationality of moral judgment and moral action in no way involves us in diminishing our respect for liberty, authenticity, sincerity or integrity. It maintains that the resolution of these issues lies in recognising that the necessary involvement of the emotions in moral judgments and moral choices need not give rise to any hesitation or reluctance to treat moral questions as needing and permitting the use of the resources of human understanding. Review 'In true Attfield-style, this book offers clarity and insight to issues in ethics and moral philosophy that will be incredibly instructive to students of philosophy as well as their lecturers. In the light of the global nature of ethical issues, never has there been a time when we have more needed lucid philosophical and informed discussion to guide our conduct. This book will be welcomed by all in providing such discussion.' Rebekah Humphreys, University of Wales Trinity St David 'Since its publication, I have continued to learn a huge amount from Robin Attfield's A Theory of Value and Obligation. Its arguments and insights remain fresh, relevant, and important, and I would strongly recommend the book to any serious student of ethical theory.' Roger Crisp, University of Oxford About the Author Richard Bambrough