The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs - Image 1

£71.76

Oxford University Press The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

Name: The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Brand: Oxford University Press
Price: 71.76 GBP
Availability: InStock

Cognition & Cognitive Psychology

Price History & Forecast

Last 8 days • 8 data points (No recent data available)

Historical

Generating forecast...

Price Distribution

Price distribution over 8 days • 1 price levels

Days at Price

Price Analysis

Most common price: £72 (8 days, 100.0%)

Price range: £72 - £72

Price levels: 1 different prices over 8 days

Description

In an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster the acquisition, retention, and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis. We may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, and beliefs that are elaborated delusional, motivated delusional, or optimistically biased. In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.

Key Features

The Epistemic Innocence Of Irrational Beliefs

Product Type : Abis Book

Brand : Oxford University Press

Product Specifications

Brand: Oxford University Press
Format: hardcover
ASIN: 0198863985
Category: Books > Subjects > Health, Family & Lifestyle > Psychology & Psychiatry > Cognition & Cognitive Psychology
Domain: Amazon UK
Release Date: 30 June 2020
Listed Since: 23 January 2020

Barcode

No barcode data available

Oxford University Press The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

Price History & Forecast

Price Distribution

Price Analysis

Description

Key Features

Product Specifications

Barcode

Similar Products You Might Like

Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality

Rationality and Belief

BAD BELIEFS:WHY THEY HAPPEN TO GOOD PEOPLE

Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief

Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief

Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry)

The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)

Belief, Agency, and Knowledge: Essays on Epistemic Normativity

Epistemic Pluralism (Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy)

Optimality Justifications: New Foundations for Epistemology

The Norm of Belief

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism: 338 (Synthese Library, 338)

Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World

The Epistemology of Belief

Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing

Ignorance: A Philosophical Study

Epistemic Blame: The Nature and Norms of Epistemic Relationships

Idealization in Epistemology: A Modest Modeling Approach

Routledge - The New Critical Thinking: An Empirically Informed Intro

Belief, Imagination, and Delusion (Mind Association Occasional Series)

The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability