Cambridge University Press The Factive Turn in Epistemology

When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume reflects major recent developments in thinking about this 'factive turn', and advances the lively debate around it in relation to core epistemological themes including perception, evidence, justification, knowledge, scepticism, rationality, and action. With clear and comprehensive chapters written by leading figures in the field, this book will be essential for students and scholars looking to engage with the state of the art in epistemology. Review 'In 2008, Wayne Riggs suggested that epistemology had taken a value turn. A decade later, Veli Mitova suggests that it has now taken a factive turn. This excellent collection of consistently high quality essays is intended to showcase this recent development. Some contributors seem to be leading the curve, others appear more interested to find out where it leads, others purport to call us back. All have interesting, worthwhile, and novel things to say on one or more of the many issues that arise along the way. The volume as a whole is important reading for anyone with serious interests in epistemology and also, since the issues often intersect with broader concerns, ethics and philosophy of mind.' Daniel Whiting, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Book Description First comprehensive treatment of the ontology of epistemic normative notions including reasons, justification, and rationality, reflecting important current debates. About the Author Veli Mitova is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg, and co-founder of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. She is the author of Believable Evidence (Cambridge, 2017).