Oxford University Press Epistemic Authority: Trust, Autonomy & Belief Theory

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski presents a comprehensive philosophical argument that self-reflective persons necessarily rely on belief by authority, challenging the notion that epistemic self-reliance is coherent. This Oxford University Press publication explores how epistemic authority remains compatible with personal autonomy, demonstrating that self-trust in both rational and emotional dimensions is not only rational but unavoidable. Zagzebski builds on Joseph Raz's established principles of authority to show how consistent self-trust logically commits us to trusting others, and further, to recognising certain individuals as epistemic authorities worthy of deference. The work addresses the philosophical foundations of knowledge acquisition and interpersonal trust, examining how we can rationally defer to others' expertise whilst maintaining intellectual autonomy. This book offers essential reading for philosophers of epistemology, scholars of trust theory, and anyone interested in understanding the logical relationship between personal autonomy and epistemic dependency in belief formation.