Springer Ethics Expertise: History, Contemporary Perspectives, and Applications: 87 (Philosophy and Medicine, 87)

Product Description Section I examines historical philosophical understandings of expertise in order to situate the current institution of bioethics. Section II focuses on philosophical analyses of the concept of expertise, asking, among other things, how it should be understood, how it can be acquired, and what such expertise warrants. Finally, section III addresses topics in bioethics and how ethics expertise should or should not be brought to bear in these areas, including expertise in the court room, in the hospital room, in the media, and in making policy. 2. A GUIDED HISTORICAL TOUR As Scott LaBarge points out, Plato’s dialogues can be viewed as an extended treatment of the concept of moral expertise, so it is fitting to begin the volume with an examination of “Socrates and Moral Expertise”. Given Socrates’ protestations (the Oracle at Delphi notwithstanding) that he knows nothing, LaBarge observes that it would be interesting to determine both what a Socratic theory of moral expertise might be and whether Socrates qualified as such an expert. Plato’s model of moral expertise is what LaBarge calls “demonstrable expertise”, which is concerned mainly with the ability to attain a goal and to explain how one did it. The problem with this account is that when one tries to solve the various problems in the model – for example, allowing that moral expertise is not an all-or-nothing skill – then one is immediately faced with the “credentials problem”. As LaBarge puts it, “. . . Review From the reviews: "The essays in this collection represent both a summary of the debate about expertise in medical ethics and also take the argument a little further. ... Ethics Expertise is a solid contribution to the literature in this area. It is an important topic and these papers help to advance the debate." (Christian Perring, Metapsychology Online Reviews, July, 2006) From the Back Cover The complexity of the modern world has led to increasing professional specialization. Experts in a variety of fields, including ethics, offer advice and solutions. But where professional expertise often involves mastering certain facts, ethics expertise is distinct. It is not clear, for example, whether moral expertise consists of knowledge of right and wrong, the ability to articulate implications of moral premises, or the display of an outstanding character oneself. This volume examines philosophical conceptions of ethics expertise from both historical and contemporary perspectives, including applications of ethics expertise in such areas as bioethics consultation, expert witnessing and policy making. It will be of interest to scholars of moral philosophy as well as contemporary practitioners in many areas of bioethics.