Springer Knowledge and Demonstration: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: 56 (The New Synthese Historical Library, 56)

This study explores the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s theory of syllogism and his conception of demonstrative knowledge. More specifically, I consider why Aristotle’s theory of demonstration presupposes his theory of syllogism. In reconsidering the relationship between Aristotle’s two Analytics, I modify this widely discussed question. The problem of the relationship between Aristotle’s logic and his theory of proof is commonly approached from the standpoint of whether the theory of demonstration presupposes the theory of syllogism. By contrast, I assume the theoretical relationship between these two theories from the start. This assumption is based on much explicit textual evidence indicating that Aristotle considers the theory of demonstration a branch of the theory of syllogism. I see no textual reasons for doubting the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s two Analytics so I attempt to uncover here the common theoretical assumptions that relate the syllogistic form of reasoning to the cognitive state (i. e. , knowledge), which is attained through syllogistic inferences. This modification of the traditional approach reflects the wider objective of this essay. Unlike the traditional interpretation, which views the Posterior Analytics in light of scientific practice, this study aims to lay the foundation for a comprehensive interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, considering this work from a metaphysical perspective. One of my major assertions is that Aristotle’s conception of substance is essential for a grasp of his theory of demonstration in general, and of the role of syllogistic logic in particular. From the Back Cover This book examines a fundamental problem in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: what is the role of syllogistic logic in the theory of demonstrative knowledge? The answer to this question is sought in Aristotle’s metaphysical theory and his conception of substance. This interpretation challenges the traditional interpretation that approaches Aristotle’s theory of demonstration from the standpoint of scientific practice. It is argued, in this book, that the Posterior Analytics’ main objective is to articulate the notion of knowledge, viewed here as a conceptualisation, rather than analysing the structure and methods of scientific explorations. The original interpretation offered in this book sheds fresh light on issues, such as the conceptual difference between Aristotle’s logic and modern logic, the relationship between Aristotle’s logic and Greek mathematics, and the differences between the Aristotelian and modern notions of knowledge and proof. In attempting to present a comprehensive interpretation of one of the most difficult works in the Aristotelian corpus, this book is of major importance first and foremost for Aristotelian scholars and historians of Greek philosophy; the historical character of the analysis offered here makes it relevant also to historians of Greek mathematics, historians of logic, historians of science in general, and philosophers of sciences.