VDM Verlag Pricing and Bidding Strategies in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs) are IT-based economic mechanisms in which bidders submit bundle bids iteratively and the auctioneer computes allocations and ask prices in each auction round. In addition to strategic problems, the design of such auction formats exhibits hard computational problems. More recently, researchers have focused on the pricing and information feedback in ICAs. This book presents the results of 5 years research in this field, whereas the emphasis was put on the practical applicability of considered auction designs and pricing mechanisms in these auctions. The main topic of this book is a comprehensive comparison of the most important auction designs proposed in the literature by means of computational and laboratory experiments. Additionally, the book presents a new auction design ALPS, which has been shown very efficient and robust in many settings. In laboratory experiments all considered auction designs were tested for practical applicability and robustness against diverse bidding strategies.