Springer The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory: A Dynamic Approach: 94 (Lecture Notes in Biomathematics, 94)

The book provides a thorough analysis of the theoretical properties of evolutionarily stable strategies (Ess's) in four models of evolutionary biology that are all based on individual selection principles. These models range from the standard frequency-dependent evolutionary game theory model of a single species to more recent models that include density-dependent and/or two-species frequency-dependent interactions. The book is unique in that it emphasizes both static and dynamic aspects of the Ess conditions. Of particular interest to game theorists will be the correspondence between dynamic stability in the biological system and either the Nash equilibrium of non-cooperative game theory or the core solution concept of cooperative game theory. The book is the first to consider, in detail, the game-theoretic effects of contestant information and two-species interactions. Of major significance to evolutionary biologists are the dynamic consequences, on the evolutionary process, of territorial ownership or repeated interactions between the same individuals. The book is intended as a text/reference for students/re- searchers in either discipline(evolutionary biology or game theory) who have a minimum mathematical maturity of a senior undergraduate.