MACMILLAN Epistemic Pluralism (Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy)

This book examines epistemic pluralism, a brand new area of research in epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline. Challenging traditional assumptions about the nature of justification, an expert team of contributors explores pluralism about justification, with compelling first-order results – including analysis of the various requisites one might want to impose on the notion of justification (and therefore of knowledge) and why. It is shown why a long-lasting dispute within epistemology about the nature of justification has reached a stalemate and how embracing a different overarching outlook might lead to progress and aid better appreciation of the relationship between the various epistemic projects scholars have been pursuing. With close connections to the idea of epistemic relativism, and with specific applications to various areas of contemporary epistemology (such as the debate over epistemic norms of action and assertion, epistemic peers' disagreement, self-knowledge and the status of philosophical disputes about ontology) this fascinating new volume is essential reading for scholars, researchers and advanced students in the discipline. Review “The collection features an impressive plurality of perspectives on epistemic pluralism. Its chapters range from broad meta-epistemological issues to detailed case-studies concerning pluralism about particular epistemic phenomena. As a whole, the collection will help to ensure that monist presuppositions that characterize much of contemporary epistemology be critically evaluated.” (Mikkel Gerken, Associate Professor, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark) “The idea that there are different ways to know is a classic―and in my view, correct―philosophical viewpoint. But while it has played a background role in the thinking of many thinkers, it is rarely discussed as a topic of research in its own right. This important collection of new work by leading epistemologists corrects that oversight, and brings epistemic pluralism into rightful focus, demonstrating why the idea that there are different kinds of knowledge is both more attractive―and more challenging to defend―than previously thought.” (Michael Patrick Lynch, Professor of Philosophy, University of Connecticut., USA) From the Back Cover This book examines epistemic pluralism, a brand new area of research in epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline. Challenging traditional assumptions about the nature of justification, an expert team of contributors explores pluralism about justification, with compelling first-order results – including analysis of the various requisites one might want to impose on the notion of justification (and therefore of knowledge) and why. It is shown why a long-lasting dispute within epistemology about the nature of justification has reached a stalemate and how embracing a different overarching outlook might lead to progress and aid better appreciation of the relationship between the various epistemic projects scholars have been pursuing. With close connections to the idea of epistemic relativism, and with specific applications to various areas of contemporary epistemology (such as the debate over epistemic norms of action and assertion, epistemic peers' disagreement, self-knowledge and the status of philosophical disputes about ontology) this fascinating new volume is essential reading for scholars, researchers and advanced students in the discipline. About the Author Annalisa Coliva is Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, US. She has published widely on the subjects of epistemology, philosophy of mind and languages and the history of analytic philosophy and is the originator of the concept of ‘hinge epistemology’. Her most recent books include The Varieties of Self-Knowledge (2016) and Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology (2015). Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen is