Springer Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology: 222 (Phaenomenologica, 222)

This collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers new perspectives of the phenomenological investigation of experiential life on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology. Not only well-known works of Husserl are interpreted from new angles, but also the latest volumes of the Husserliana are closely examined. In a variety of ways, the contributors explore the emergence of reason in experience that is disclosed in the very regions that are traditionally considered to be “irrational” or “pre-rational.” The leading idea of such explorations is Husserl’s view that perception, affectivity, and volition are regarded as the three aspects of reason. Without affectivity, which is supposedly irrational, no rationality can be established in the spheres of representation and volition, whereas volitional and representational acts consistently structure the process of affective experience. In such a framework, it is also shown that theoretical and practical reason are inseparably intertwined. Thus, the papers collected here can be regarded as a collaborative phenomenological investigation into the entanglement and mutual dependency of the supposedly “rational” and the “irrational” as well as that of the “practical” and the “theoretical.”  From the Back Cover This collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers new perspectives of the phenomenological investigation of experiential life on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology. Not only well-known works of Husserl are interpreted from new angles, but also the latest volumes of the Husserliana are closely examined. In a variety of ways, the contributors explore the emergence of reason in experience that is disclosed in the very regions that are traditionally considered to be “irrational” or “pre-rational.” The leading idea of such explorations is Husserl’s view that perception, affectivity, and volition are regarded as the three aspects of reason. Without affectivity, which is supposedly irrational, no rationality can be established in the spheres of representation and volition, whereas volitional and representational acts consistently structure the process of affective experience. In such a framework, it is also shown that theoretical and practical reason are inseparably intertwined. Thus, the papers collected here can be regarded as a collaborative phenomenological investigation into the entanglement and mutual dependency of the supposedly “rational” and the “irrational” as well as that of the “practical” and the “theoretical.” About the Author Roberto Walton (Ph.D., Universidad de Buenos Aires) is Professor at the University of Buenos Aires, and member of the National Council for Scientific Research of Argentina. He is author of Husserl. Mundo, conciencia y temporalidad (Buenos Aires, 1993), El fenómeno y sus configuraciones (Buenos Aires,1993), and Intencionalidad y horizonticidad (Cali, 2015). He is a member of the Editorial Board of Husserl Studies. Shigeru Taguchi (Ph.D., Bergische Universität Wuppertal) is Associate Professor at Hokkaido University, Japan. He is author of Das Problem des ‘Ur-Ich’ bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen ‘Nähe’ des Selbst (Dordrecht, 2006). His research topics are Husserlian phenomenology and modern Japanese philosophy. He is a member of the Editorial Board of Contributions to Phenomenology. Roberto Rubio (Ph.D., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg) is Associate Professor at the Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile. He is author of Zur Möglichkeit einer Philosophie des Verstehens. Das produktive Scheitern Heideggers (Tübingen, 2006). His areas of research are Heidegger’s philosophy and phenomenological aesthetics. He is currently working on a book on Heidegger’s philosophy of the image.