MACMILLAN An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics: A Reflection on Abortion and Euthanasia

This book articulates an African conception of dignity in light of the salient axiological category of personhood in African cultures. The idea of personhood embodies a moral system for evaluating human lives exuding with virtue or ones that are morally excellent. This book argues that this idea of personhood embodies an under-explored conception of dignity, which accounts for it in terms of our capacity for the virtue of sympathy. It then proceeds to apply this personhood-based conception of dignity to bioethical questions, specifically, those of abortion and euthanasia. Regarding abortion, it concludes that it is impermissible since foetuses possess partial moral status. Regarding euthanasia, it argues that it is permissible for reasons revolving around avoiding the reversing of personhood. It also, though, minimally, touches on the questions regarding the mentally disabled and animals, to which it assigns lower moral status. Review “A welcome contribution to the literature on African Philosophy. Motsamai Molefe’s important book is an innovative approach to bioethical questions, which challenges the cognitive empire from the Global North and looks South for moral guidance on moral questions regarding abortion and euthanasia”―Luís Cordeiro Rodrigues, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Hunan University, China "A bold inquiry into some of the ethical dilemmas at the margins of life in which Motsamai Molefe proposes a fresh and alternative perspective on dignity for those who are interested in the practical implications of an African approach to personhood."  ―Oritsegbubemi Oyowe, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of the Western Cape, South Africa From the Back Cover This book articulates an African conception of dignity in light of the salient axiological category of personhood in African cultures. The idea of personhood embodies a moral system for evaluating human lives exuding with virtue or ones that are morally excellent. This book argues that this idea of personhood embodies an under-explored conception of dignity, which accounts for it in terms of our capacity for the virtue of sympathy. It then proceeds to apply this personhood-based conception of dignity to bioethical questions, specifically, those of abortion and euthanasia. Regarding abortion, it concludes that it is impermissible since foetuses possess partial moral status. Regarding euthanasia, it argues that it is permissible for reasons revolving around avoiding the reversing of personhood. It also, though, minimally, touches on the questions regarding the mentally disabled and animals, to which it assigns lower moral status. About the Author Motsamai Molefe is a senior researcher at the University of Fort Hare, South Africa.