Edward Elgar Publishing Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy

This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policymakers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy. Review 'Lippi's book offers a number of very interesting extensions of the literature on central bank independence and credibility of monetary policy. The author combines a good knowledge of this topic with interesting new insights. No doubt, this book will be very useful for scholars in this rapidly developing research area.' -- Jakob de Haan, University of Groningen, The Netherlands About the Author Francesco Lippi, Economist, Research Department, Bank of Italy With W. Letterie and O.H. Swank