CREATESPACE Military and Security Review

Remy MauduitCombat is winding down in Afghanistan, and—as in Iraq—serious questions have arisen about the value and intent of counterinsurgency (COIN). We remember the motto No More COINs in the 1970s after Vietnam. Today, lessons learned should tell us again that we should avoid such wars, but it is doubtful that we can do so in the future any more than we have in the past. Thus, perhaps we should now think seriously about the fundamental cause of the most prevalent form of conflict—insurgency.“A Strategy to Defeat ISIS”IntroductionIt has been a little over a year since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of the caliphate in Mosul on 29 June 2014. Since then, ISIS has expanded its dominance in the region and there is little evidence that it is getting weaker. In that same period, much has been written, and there is considerable debate regarding a strategy to defeat, and narratives to counter ISIS. However, until now, no comprehensive solution exists. To defeat ISIS, the U.S. must implement a population-centric strategy based upon three lines of effort that require simultaneous implementation and detailed coordination. The fundamental components of the population-centric strategy consist of the following: 1. A comprehensive communications plan that undermines the ISIS propaganda machine,2. Ground combat operations conducted by a multi-national coalition force, 3. Distribution of basic goods and services to non-combatants in Syria and Iraq.The population-centric strategy outlined here is designed to defeat ISIS by eroding its base of support through local stakeholders within the population. Moreover, it provides political and military decision makers a tailored road map that includes tactical, operational and strategic recommendations to implement across the three lines of effort and aligns ongoing military, humanitarian and diplomatic efforts under a common objective. With the proper authorities, resources and commitment, application of the population-centric strategy can result in the defeat of ISIS within 12 months.•It appears that Pakistani usurper Musharraf saw the FATA operations as a good way to convince the Americans that the real centre of gravity of terrorism was FATA.This dovetailed brilliantly with providing sanctuary to Afghan Taliban who were numerically much larger than foreign Jihadis.•Pakistani state regards division of Afghanistan on ethnic lines as a serious threat for Pakistan as this would intensify Pashtun nationalism an act as a primer for Afghanistan and Pakistans Pashtuns to combine and form a Pashtun state.