Lexington Books The Death of Deliberation: Gridlock and the Politics of Effort in the United States Senate

Product Description The first edition of The Death of Deliberation revealed how the Senate legislates in a contentious environment. Yet it has been unable to legislate in recent years. Since 2013, the Senate has become more dysfunctional and gridlock has increased. The 115th Congress was one of the least productive two-year stretches in the Senate's history. This second edition of The Death of Deliberation accounts for this dramatic turn of events. Review Death of Deliberation is an excellent diagnosis of the stalemate gripping the U.S. Senate. It highlights the rising role of party leaders in a once-egalitarian chamber, and how partisan electoral interests have intensified arguments over which issues are voted upon. James Wallner brings a unique perspective to this project because he is able to combine the keen insights of a Senate insider with the broad view of a political scientist.--Gregory Koger, University of Miami The Death of Deliberation is an incredibly astute take on the modern U.S. Senate. Wallner is able to combine insights from his time working the chamber with a deep understanding of the contemporary political science literature to make a compelling and provocative argument about why today's Senate often fails to enact policies. The main thrust of his argument is that in most cases the Senate fails to act because senators rarely undertake the effort necessary to force action. By delegating negotiations to party leaders, senators act as bystanders to the inaction that so many of them decry. This is an important argument that politicians, pundits, journalists, and students of Congress should read and grapple with.--Jason M. Roberts, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill "James Wallner challenges convention wisdom about the U.S. Senate in this extraordinary and systemic view of how the Senate passes legislation in its current polarized environment. He answers why gridlock does not occur on those occasions when the Senate legislates by showing the emergence of a powerful and centralized party leadership in Congress. Wallner's unique contribution reveals the extent to which partisan cooperation coexists even with deep ideological disagreement among rank-and-file senators. Using extensive data analysis and case studies, he proposes a theory of "structured consent" which explains how polarization actually produces stronger leaders. He argues that the majority and minority leaders perform a moderating function by acting within certain bounds to reduce the conflict and instability inherent in the current Senate's environment. This is a book that should be required of all classes on Congress and for anyone (especially U.S. Senators) interested in how the modern-day Senate works."--James A. Thurber, Distinguished Professor, American University About the Author James I. Wallner is senior fellow at the R Street Institute