CREATESPACE Changez Force andTriple Minefield battle-grand operational failure in 1971 War

•Colonel Sardar Yahya Effendi a direct participant states about missed opportunities in this battle as below :--- “THE ENEMY HAD BEEN FIXED BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND LAYER OF MINEFIELDS FOR FIVE DAYS, BUT NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO COUNTER ATTACK AND DESTROY THE ENEMY BETWEEN THE TWO MINEFIELDS. A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST ON THE NIGHT 10/11 DECEMBER WHEN THE ENEMY HAD PUT IN HIS MAXIMUM EFFORT TO GET ACROSS THE SECOND MINEFIELD LAYER ,HE WAS STILL REGAINING HIS TACTICAL BALANCE UP TO THE MORNING OF 13 DECEMBER. A COUNTER ATTACK BY 8 INDEPENDENT BRIGADE GROUP SUPPORTED BY CHANGEZ FORCE WOULD HAVE YIELDED RICH DIVIDENDS. IT COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A MAJOR COUNTER OFFENSIVE , EVENTUALLY DRAWING IN THE 6 ARMOURED DIVISION INTO A DECISIVE RIPOSTE.BUT INSTEAD WE SET BACK IN OUR DEFENCES WAITING FOR THE ENEMY TO ATTACK.•EFFENDI THUS SUMMED UP POOR AND SUB STANDARD PAKISTANI LEADERSHIP AT BRIGADE , DIVISION AND CORPS LEVEL AS FOLLOWING :-- “ THE CORPS AND LOWER FORMATIONS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN STAFFED BY TYROS , AS THEY LET EVERY OPPORTUNITY SLIP OUT OF THEIR GRASP.••It has frequently been asserted that 1 Corps had no other alternative but to resort to a passive defence. This is a totally false assertion, if we take into account the resources available to 1 Corps vis-a-vis the Indians. 1 Corps had nine tank regiments in all as against six Indian tank regiments in Shakargarh Bulge. Further 17 Division was not utilised at all to do anything throughout the war. In Chamb with just a slight numerical superiority and qualitative inferiority in tanks and parity in infantry General Eftikhar wrested the initiative from Indians in such a manner that by 10th December the Indians had withdrawn one battalion from 168 Brigade in the 'X Force Sector' opposite Charwa in 1 Corps area, and had placed the same brigade at few hours notice to move to Chamb in view of 23 Divisions attack at Pallanwala. The Pakistani GHQ's strategy in Shakargarh was reactive rather than proactive, and all initiative despite numerical superiority in armour was surrendered to the Indians. A strategy involving a more offensive posture would have definitely forced the overcautious Indians to resort to the defensive. It was here that we enter the realm of military talent. There was no general officer in 1 Corps with the operational talent or resolution of an Eftikhar; and this in the final analysis was the singular misfortune of Pakistan's 1 Corps. Till ceasefire five armoured regiments were kept on sentry duty in Pasrur area and were not utilised. The saying that a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity, can be exactly applied to 1 Corps conduct of battle in Shakargarh Bulge.