Bloomsbury God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism

God and fictional objects are central topics within philosophy, but rarely do the respective discussions overlap. Until now the two fields have remained independent. Applying the debate about fictional objects to issues of theology for the first time, John-Mark L. Miravalle bridges these two fields and presents a new approach to notions of God, creatures, and existence. Miravalle explains why meinongianism, which holds that certain things can serve as intentional objects with properties, even though they do not exist, can facilitate talk of nonexistence better than other metaphysical viewpoints, such as platonism, modal realism and pretense-theory. He identifies points of connection between theology and nonexistents and uses meinongianism to buttress the cosmological and ontological arguments for God's existence. As a result he is able to explore fresh solutions to problems of classical theism, from the necessary existence of God and creation ex nihilo to free will and the problem of evil. By revealing how a particular account of fictional objects is especially harmonious with and supportive of the major claims of traditional theism, Miravalle makes a major contribution to theistic metaphysics. Review Can we afford not to abide by Frege's third principle? Does it make sense to extract just one proposition from the coherent whole of Meinong's philosophy? Miravalle's answer to both questions is in the affirmative. It is interesting to see the author follow this path with abundant argument and engagement with a wide variety of thinkers.Philippe-André Holzer, Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Freiburg, SwitzerlandThe book is an admirable example of serious work in analytic theology by providing a fascinating twist on the perennial question, "How does nothing play a role in the coming to be of something?+? By ably defending a meinongian approach to non-existent things, Miravalle signals a way past the seeming difficulties spawned by Russell's analysis of non-existence and his legacy for classical theism. Filled with easy intuitions and cogent argumentation across a variety of thorny philosophical and theological contexts, the book insightfully defends and applies the meinongian point of view. The reader will be surprised by the way in which the meinongian position is a natural fit with seemingly disconnected philosophical and theological perspectives. Whereas future scholars will be sure to test the metaphysical claims made, it is certain that they will face a formidable defender of the positions to be found in this book.Paul Symington Professor of Philosophy, Franciscan University of Steubenville, USAWhat if the modern dogma that "existence is not a [first-order] predicate+? has obscured fundamental theological insights about God and creation? With ambition and force, Miravalle defends the view that existence characterizes some things and not others, and shows that rightly conceptualizing non-existence and non-existent things is crucial for appreciating central claims and arguments of classical theism.Joshua Hochschild, Monsignor Robert R. Kline Professor of Philosophy, Mount St. Mary's University, USA About the Author John-Mark Miravalle is Assistant Professor of Theology in the Seminary at Mount St. Mary's University, USA.