Cambridge University Press Judicial Vetoes: Decision-making on Mixed Selection Constitutional Courts (Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy)

How does the selection of judges influence the work they do in important constitutional courts? Does mixed judicial selection, which allows more players to choose judges, result in a court that is more independent and one that can check powerful executives and legislators? Existing literature on constitutional courts tends to focus on how judicial behaviour is motivated by judges' political preferences. Lydia Brashear Tiede argues for a new approach, showing that, under mixed selection, institutions choose different types of judges who represent different approaches to constitutional adjudication and thus have different propensities for striking down laws. Using empirical evidence from the constitutional courts of Chile and Colombia, this book develops a framework for understanding the factors, external and internal to courts, which lead individual judges, as well as the courts in which they work, to veto a law. Book Description Provides an innovative study of how mixed judicial selection operates to influence judges' and courts' decisions. About the Author Lydia Brashear Tiede is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Houston. Her current research focuses on constitutional courts in Latin America and Eastern Europe as well as comparative research on the rule of law, judicial independence, and democratic backsliding in developing countries.