Cambridge University Press Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows. Review 'This book is a gem and makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of distributive politics. Holland's discussion of the distributive implications of variation in forbearance for poor and rich citizens is brilliant.' Maria Victoria Murillo, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University'When do governments choose to exercise forbearance and tolerate violations of the law? This question is at the heart of this painstakingly well-executed investigation of government responses to squatting and street vending in three Latin American cities. This book is an instant classic.' Hillel Soifer, Temple University, Philadelphia'When we think of law being selectively applied in Latin America, our minds call up accounts of the wealthy and the powerful getting away with murder. This meticulously executed book turns the tables, showing how the state sometimes withholds enforcement to achieve redistributive ends. This is the most interesting twist on the politics of social provision and the rule of law to come along in many years.' Daniel M. Brinks, University of Texas, Austin'This is one of those rare books that changes forever the way you think about an issue, in this case the endemic and enduring informality found across the developing world.' Ben Ross Schneider, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Book Description The book explains why and when laws go unenforced in developing countries. About the Author Alisha C. Holland is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at Princeton University, New Jersey. She was a Junior Fellow at the Society of Fellows at Harvard University, Massachusetts. Holland's doctoral dissertation received the Best Dissertation Award from the Urban Politics Section of the American Political Science Association and the Robert Noxon Toppan Award for the best dissertation from the Department of Government at Harvard University. Her research on Latin American and urban politics has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, and Latin American Research Review.