Cambridge University Press Partisan Investment in the Global Economy: Why the Left Loves Foreign Direct Investment and FDI Loves the Left

Product Description Pinto develops a partisan theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) arguing that left-wing governments choose policies that allow easier entry by foreign investors more than right-wing governments, and that foreign investors prefer to invest in countries governed by the left. To reach this determination, the book derives the conditions under which investment flows should be expected to affect the relative demand for the services supplied by economic actors in host countries. Based on these expected distributive consequences, a political economy model of the regulation of FDI and changes in investment performance within countries and over time is developed. The theory is tested using both cross-national statistical analysis and two case studies exploring the development of the foreign investment regimes and their performance over the past century in Argentina and South Korea. Review 'Pinto explores one of the key political questions asked of globalization: when and why would a government seek foreign direct investment? By providing analysts with a lucid and thorough examination of data on cross-country variation in both flows and regulation of FDI, Pinto shows how and why left-leaning parties are more likely to support FDI. This is a must-read book for scholars interested in economic development, globalization, and the politics of investment.' Judith Goldstein, Stanford University'In breaking with the commonly predicted expectation about the role of labor in attracting foreign investments, this book compels the attention of everyone working in political economy. It challenges us to think carefully about the linkages between partisanship, interest groups, political preferences, and policy outcomes. If you thought left-wing governments always repel foreign investments, you must read this book to find out the conditions in which the reverse is true, such that investment feels reassured by the support of labor in preventing nationalist blockage by outsiders. This is a vital book to all students of national and comparative political economy in its methodologically sophisticated way of exploring the linkages among domestic politics, interest groups, and policy outcomes. It challenges conventional wisdom with a strongly researched set of data to back up its claims.' Peter Gourevitch, University of California, San Diego'This book provides fresh insight into how domestic politics affects FDI. Pinto advances a highly original argument about the role of partisanship in shaping FDI and presents a battery of evidence to support his claims. The result is an important study that will be of interest to both economists and political scientists.' Edward Mansfield, University of Pennsylvania'Pinto presents a new, refreshing, and counterintuitive view of the politics of foreign direct investment. There's no doubt this will be seen as an exciting contribution to the literature.' David Stasavage, New York University'At the heart of Pablo Pinto's Partisan Investment in the Global Economy is a surprising empirical claim: governments of the Left like foreign direct investment (FDI), and the feeling is mutual … Through sharp argumentation and solid empirical evidence, Pinto effectively shifts the burden of proof with regard to how progressives ought to regard foreign direct investment.' James E. Mahon, Jr, Latin American Research Review Book Description Develops a partisan theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) to explain variance in FDI regulation and resulting foreign investment inflows. About the Author Pablo M. Pinto is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. His work has been published or is forthcoming in International Organization, the Review of International Political Economy, State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Economics and Politics and Comparative Political Studies. In addition to this book, he is co-author of Politics and Foreign Direct I