Northwestern Thinking and the I: Hegel and the Critique of Kant

Product Description What is the relation between thinking and the I that thinks? And what is the relation between thought and reality? The ordinary view shared by modern philosophers from Descartes to Kant, as well as by common sense, is that there is only thought when someone thinks something, and thoughts and concepts are mental acts that refer to objects outside us. In Thinking and the I: Hegel and the Critique of Kant, Alfredo Ferrarin shows that Hegel's philosophy entails a radical criticism of this ordinary conception of thinking. Breaking with the habitual presuppositions of both modern philosophy and common sense, Ferrarin explains that thought, negation, truth, reflection, and dialectic for Hegel are not properties of an I and cannot be reduced to the subjective activity of a self-conscious subject. Rather, he elucidates, thought is objective for Hegel in different senses. Reality as a whole is animated by a movement of thought and an unconscious logic as a spontaneity that reifies itself in determinate forms. Ferrarin concludes the book with a comprehensive comparison of Hegel's and Kant's concepts of reason. While it mainly focuses on Hegel's Phenomenology, Science of Logic, and Encyclopaedia, this ambitious book covers all aspects of Hegel's philosophy. Its originality and strength lie in its recovery of the original core of Hegel's dialectic over and above its currently predominant transcendental, neopragmatist, or realist appropriations. It will be essential reading for all students of Hegel, Kant, and German idealism in general for years to come. Review "[Ferrarin] explores what it might look like to put Kant and Hegel in deeper conversation with each other with regard to reason and the nature of subjectivity. This move has the effect of making room for a productive, critical reevaluation of Hegel's handling (and occasional mishandling) of some of Kant's arguments about reason and for using that reevaluation as a starting point for a fresh understanding of Hegel's conception of thought." --L. Bernhardt, University of Southern Indiana for CHOICE "It seems inconceivable that Kant had read the Phenomenology, or the Science of Logic, and would then afterwards have been able to have a philosophical discussion with Hegel about it. This inconceivability is not due to our lack of imagination but has a fundamentum in re, which needs explanation. One of the things I liked very much about Ferrarin's book is that he takes on the challenge to give such an explanation. The first part of this explanation . . . is an exposition of one element of Hegel's philosophy that sets him radically apart from the Kantian and pre-Kantian tradition, namely his account of thought as something that is 'objective' in a sense that is incompatible with its traditional description as an activity of the self-conscious subject. The other part is a diagnosis and criticism of Hegel's own engagement with Kant's philosophy . . . Ferrarin shows in great detail and with admirable exegetical subtlety how many of Hegel's characterizations of Kant's system are based on a rather superficial, uncharitable, and simplistic reading of Kant's writings. Moreover, Ferrarin argues that surprisingly many of Hegel's critical responses and alleged alternatives to what he sees in Kant can already be found in Kant himself. Given the resulting more charitable understanding of Kant, the differences between their philosophies are less insurmountable and a meaningful dialogue can begin--if not between Kant and Hegel, then between contemporary inhabitants of planet Kant and planet Hegel." --Tobias Rosefeldt, SGIR Review "It is a great merit of Ferrarin's book to blend systematic argument with careful attention to philological detail. Moreover, its procedure is truly dialectical insofar as crucial concepts are not taken as fixed at the outset, but their content is developed in the course of the argument. This alone makes the book deeply rewarding for anyone in