Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) - Image 1

£93.79

Cambridge University Press Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Name: Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
Brand: Cambridge University Press
Price: 93.79 GBP
Availability: InStock

Political Economy

It has never been this cheap. We have no record of a lower price.

£94 today · cheaper than every other day in the last 3 months

NEW HERE?

Amazon shows you one price. We show you all of them.

Tosheroon watches Amazon prices so you don't have to. Every product on Amazon has a price history — we make it visible. Set the price you'd actually pay, and we'll email you the second it gets there. No app, no account, one email.

WHAT'S ON THIS PAGE

↓ Price chart
when this has been cheap or pricey

↓ Forecast
where the price is heading next

↓ Statistics
all-time high & low, recent range

↑ Price alert
name your number, we'll email you

Price History & Forecast

Grey patches = out of stock. Cheaper = lower on the chart. Hover for exact prices.

Last 80 days · 80 data points (no recent data)

Historical

Generating forecast…

Price Distribution

Price distribution over 80 days • 2 price levels

Days at Price

Current Price

Price Analysis

Most common price: £94 (72 days, 90.0%)

Price range: £94 - £98

Price levels: 2 different prices over 80 days

Description

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Product Specifications

Brand: Cambridge University Press
Format: hardcover
ASIN: 0521862094
Category: Books > Subjects > Business, Finance & Law > Economics > Political Economy
Domain: Amazon UK
Release Date: 14 September 2006
Listed Since: 29 January 2007

Barcode

No barcode data available

Cambridge University Press Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

It has never been this cheap. We have no record of a lower price.

Price History & Forecast

Price Distribution

Price Analysis

Description

Product Specifications

Barcode

Similar Products You Might Like

Why Delegate?

The Politics of Delegation

Delegation in Contemporary Democracies: 43 (Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science)

Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance

Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Comparative Politics)

The European Union's Foreign Economic Policies: A Principal-Agent Perspective (Journal of European Public Policy Series)

International Institutions and National Policies

International Organizations as Self-Directed Actors: A Framework for Analysis (Global Institutions)

Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise: 0

International Organisations and Global Problems: Theories and Explanations

Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

Contemporary Political Agency: Theory and Practice (Routledge Series on Global Order Studies)

Routledge - Who Participates in Global Governance? Book

Why International Organizations Hate Politics: Depoliticizing the World (Global Institutions)

The Politics of Expertise in International Organizations: How International Bureaucracies Produce and Mobilize Knowledge (Global Institutions)

Decision Making Within International Organisations (Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science)

Agents, Actors, Actorhood: Institutional Perspectives on the Nature of Agency, Action, and Authority: 58 (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 58)

Macmillan International Organization in the Anarchical Society

Automated decision-making in the public sector. Artificial Intelligence vs Administrative Intelligence?

Routledge International Organizations as Self-Directed Actors

Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy: Subnational Governments in International Affairs (Routledge New Diplomacy Studies)

Delegate Representation in Congress: Analysis & Current Standing (Congressional Policies, Practices & Procedures Series)

International Organization Initiatives: How and Why Organizations Adapt and Change

International Organizations: Perspectives on Global Governance