Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) - Image 1

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Cambridge University Press Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Name: Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
Brand: Cambridge University Press
Price: 95.29 GBP
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Political Economy

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Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Product Specifications

Brand: Cambridge University Press
Format: hardcover
ASIN: 0521862094
Category: Books > Subjects > Business, Finance & Law > Economics > Political Economy
Domain: Amazon UK
Release Date: 14 September 2006
Listed Since: 29 January 2007

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Cambridge University Press Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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