Cambridge University Press The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. Review "...cogently argued and well worth reading..." Dialogue Book Description A challenging study of the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. From the Back Cover In this original and challenging study, Andre Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able to justifiably self-attribute consciously held propositional attitudes such as belief. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge.