Cambridge University Press Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy

This book details the policy subsystems - links among members of Congress, interest groups, program beneficiaries, federal and subnational government agencies - that blanket the American political landscape. Robert Stein and Kenneth Bickers have constructed a database detailing federal outlays to Congressional districts for each federal program, and use it to examine four myths about the impact of policy subsystems on American government and democratic practice. These include the myth that policy subsystems are a major contributor to the federal deficit; that once created, federal programs grow inexorably and rarely die; that to garner support for their programs, subsystem actors seek to universalize the geographic scope of program benefits; and that the flow of program benefits to constituencies in congressional districts ensures the re-election of legislators. Review 'This book devotes needed attention to the linkages between members of Congress, beneficiaries of federal programs (both constituents and interest groups), and intergovernmental agencies. Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers have marshalled an impressive array of data to test several hypothesis that question long-held beliefs related to the distribution of federal benefits. Readers of this book will be impressed by the frequency with which the authors' findings call into question conventional wisdom and suggest alternative, yet reasonable interpretations for the existance of federal programs.' Journal of Politics Book Description Stein and Bickers explore the policy subsystems that blanket the American political landscape. From the Back Cover This book details the policy subsystems - links among members of Congress, interest groups, program beneficiaries, and federal and subnational government agencies - that blanket the American political landscape. Robert Stein and Kenneth Bickers have constructed a new data-base detailing federal outlays to congressional districts for each federal program, and use it to examine four myths about the impact of policy subsystems on American government and democratic practice. These include the myth that policy subsystems are a major contributor to the federal deficit; that, once created, federal programs grow inexorably and rarely die; that, to garner support for their programs, subsystem actors seek to universalize the geographic scope of program benefits; and that the flow of program benefits to constituencies in congressional districts ensures the reelection of legislators. The authors conclude with an appraisal of proposals for reforming the American political system, including a balanced budget amendment, a presidential line-item veto, term limitations, campaign finance reform, and the reorganization of congressional committees.