Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) - Image 1

£73.99

Cambridge University Press Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Name: Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
Brand: Cambridge University Press
Price: 73.99 GBP
Availability: InStock

Democracy

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Description

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.

Product Specifications

Brand: Cambridge University Press
Format: hardcover
ASIN: 0521432456
Category: Books > Subjects > Politics, Philosophy & Social Sciences > Government & Politics > Political Science & Ideology > Democracy
Domain: Amazon UK
Release Date: 26 January 1996
Listed Since: 02 February 2007

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Cambridge University Press Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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