Cambridge University Press Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity

Review "Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity is an admirable piece of work, a well-argued and insightful book. It is a strength of the book that Greco has read widely on the topic and attempts to synthesize much of what has been written." --George Lăzăroiu, PhD /IISHSS, New York, Review of Contemporary Philosophy"...It is an honor to review this book.... the book is an excellent example of the pursuit of an important research project.... the way the book is laid out (as well as the updatings of the papers the other chapters are based on) make the book a great read..." --Trent Dougherty, Baylor University, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly"...Achieving Knowledge is a very competent addition to the literature, clearly meriting the attention of the growing number of epistemologists concerned with questions of value, virtue and justification... Achieving Knowledge is fundamentally an attempt to integrate competing intuitions concerning epistemic normativity into a single unifying theory..." --Michael-John Turp, University of Durham, UK, Philosophy in Review Product Description When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us. Book Description Argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, exploring questions of what it is and what kind of value it has. About the Author John Greco is the Leonard and Elizabeth Eslick Chair in Philosophy at Saint Louis University. His previous publications include Putting Skeptics in their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and their Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge, 2000). He is also the editor of The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism (2008), Sosa and his Critics (2004) as well as co-editor of Rationality and the Good (2007) and The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (1999).