Springer Economic Models of Trade Unions: 9 (International Studies in Economic Modelling)

One: Unions as Organizations.- 1. The microeconomic theory of the trade union.- 1.1 Foundations.- 1.2 Trade unions in the literature.- 1.3 A model of a utilitarian trade union.- 1.4 On extensions and problems.- 1.5 Conclusion.- References.- 2. Labour union objectives and collective bargaining.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The specification of union goals.- 2.3 The union's majority preference relation.- 2.4 Are the union's preferences cardinal?.- 2.5 Union-firm bargaining solutions.- References.- 3. Union wages, temporary lay-offs, and seniority.- 3.1 A model of a unionized sector under seniority rule.- 3.2 Steady-state comparisons.- 3.3 The effect of the seniority rule for lay-offs.- 3.4 Concluding remarks.- References.- 4. The determination of the union status of workers.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 A model of union status determination.- 4.3 The data and econometric framework.- 4.4 Estimation.- 4.5 Analysis of results.- 4.6 Summary and conclusions.- References.- Two: Union-Employer Relations.- 5. Wage bargaining and employment.- 5.1 A simple monopoly union.- 5.2 Efficient bargains.- 5.3 The union as a commune: A digression.- 5.4 Some simple conventions.- 5.5 Formal bargaining theory.- 5.6 Sales constraints and incremental bargaining.- 5.7 Conclusion.- References.- 6. Longitudinal analyses of the effects of trade unions.- 6.1 Longitudinal models of what unions do.- 6.2 The problem of measurement error.- 6.3 Comparisons of longitudinal and cross-section estimates of union effects.- 6.4 Bounding the true impact?.- 6.5 Conclusion.- References.- 7. Trade unions and optimal labour contracts.- 7.1 Competitive equilibria.- 7.2 Optimal labour contracts and a union without internal risk-sharing.- 7.3 Efficient bargaining.- 7.4 Summary and concluding remarks.- References.- 8. Testing the efficiency of employment contracts.- 8.1 Introduction.- 8.2 Some evidence from experimental data.- 8.3 A framework for inference.- 8.4 Empirical implementation.- 8.5 Concluding remarks.- References.- Appendix A: Definitions and sources for variables used In the empirical analysis.- Appendix B: Problems of empirical implementation.- 9. Bargaining and strikes.- 9.1 Introduction.- 9.2 A model with limited delay between offers.- 9.3 A model with decay.- 9.4 Concluding remarks.- Referenees.- 10. An investigation into the determinants of U.S. strike activity.- 10.1 Construction of the data and variables.- 10.2 Empirical specification and results.- 10.3 Summary of the findings.- References.- Three: Unions and Macroeconomic Performance.- 11. Hysterisis in unemployment.- 11.1 Introduction.- 11.2 The derived demand for labour.- 11.3 Wage setting in a pure insider model.- 11.4 Wage setting with some pressure from outsiders.- 11.5 Unemployment duration and the wage setting process.- 11.6 Conclusion.- References.- 12. Long-term unemployment and macroeconomic policy.- 12.1 Transmission of macroeconomic policies to the labour market.- 12.2 The labour market.- 12.3 Persistence of policy effects in the labour market.- 12.4 Concluding remarks.- References.- 13. Maeroeconomic stabilization policy and trade union behaviour as a repeated game.- 13.1 Introduction.- 13.2 Government intervention and union behaviour in a single-state game.- 13.3 Non-co-operative equilibrium in a multi-stage game.- 13.4 Conclusion.- References.- 14. The rise in unemployment: A multi-country study.- 14.1 Introduction.- 14.2 A theoretical framework for analysis.- 14.3 Empirical results.- 14.4 Accounting for the rise in unemployment.- 14.5 The role of institutions: A comparative assessment.- Concluding remarks.- References.- Appendix: Data sources.- 15. The regulation of inflation and unemployment.- 15.1 Wage price stability and the theory of public goods.- 15.2 The impact of a centralized system of industrial relations.- 15.3 Public good or private interest?.- 15.4 An Index of neocorporatism.- 15.5 Empirical verification.- 15.6 Concluding remarks.- References.- Author index.